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The purpose of this study is two-fold: first, to explain the demise of 
subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets in the U.S. from the viewpoint of 
measuring  and  managing  mortgage  credit  risk;  and  secondly,  to 
discuss  several  policy  lessons  that  can  be  learned  from  the market 
meltdown.  To  that  end,  three  tiers  of  mortgage  credit  models  are 
elaborated,  including  the  scoring  (or  risk  rank-ordering),  risk-based 
pricing, and “sizing” (or the analytics used in determining subordination 
levels  of  credit-sensitive  mortgage  backed  security  (MBS)  deals) 
models. Using these as conceptual underpinning, empirical evidence is 
surveyed to document key contributing factors to the market demise. 
Those  that  are  identified  include  the  non-availability  of  reliable 
mortgage performance data, lack of theory as well as industry best-
practices in performing simulation-based mortgage risk assessments, 
complex  and  arcane  structures  of  mortgage  backed  securities,  and 
information  asymmetry  among  the  parties  involved  in  the  security 
transactions. The overall conclusion derived is that the participants to 
these market segments surpass their risk management capabilities in 
globalizing  funding  for  subprime  and  Alt-A  mortgages.  The  policy 
lessons emphasized are the importance of the infrastructure of proper 
risk  assessment  and  risk-based  pricing,  as  well  as  prudent  and 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A lexicon definition of “credit” is trust of others. When institutional mortgage 
lending started in the U.S. about 180 years ago, mortgage credit followed this 
literal meaning. The Terminating Building Society (TBS), the predominant 
lending institution at that time, was nothing but a group of trustworthy friends 
and relatives living close to each other. They contributed a fixed amount of 
money periodically, took turns in receiving the collected funds in the order of 
the interest to be paid, built houses with the received sums, and terminated the 
institution once all members were housed.
1   
 
The meaning of credit has changed over time in the U.S. mortgage market 
from a perception-based concept to a more statistical construct. In the current 
internet  age,  borrower  credits  are  assessed  electronically  and  on-line  by 
distant lenders, via scorecards and other data- and model-driven measures. 
The subprime lending sector, which took off from the early 2000s, went even 
further by attempting to create a market for trading  mortgage credit risk. The 
consequence, as well known, is that the attempt not only failed, but also has 
triggered a once-in-a-lifetime turmoil in the global financial system. 
 
What went wrong, who was responsible, and what remedies can be instituted 
to prevent a similar credit event from occurring again? These are the questions 
that this study aims to shed light on.  
 
There is already a growing volume of so-called subprime literature, which 
documents various causes and lessons of the on-going financial crisis.
2 The 
approach taken in the current study is to examine such issues in the limited 
scope of measuring and managing mortgage credit risk. To that end, I will 
first elaborate a conceptual underpinning of measuring mortgage credit risk, 
and secondly, provide a critical survey of relevant theoretical and empirical 
studies. Finally, I will discuss several policy lessons that have been learned 
from the subprime mortgage debacle. 
 
The leverage in the U.S. mortgage market started burgeoning since the mid 
1980s, and sharply expanded from the early 2000s. In particular, the mortgage 
debt  outstanding  (MDO),  for  both  residential  and  commercial  properties, 
surpasses  any  other  lending  sector  in  the  U.S.,  both  in  terms  of  speed  of 
growth and size of outstanding loans. The MDO growth rate in 2000-2006 
was 13.5 percent per annum, 2-3 times higher than other debt sectors; and the 
MDO level amounted to $13.5 trillion at the end of 2006, greater than the sum 
                                                            
1 See  Green  and  Wachter  (2005)  and  Cho  (2007)  for  the  evolution  of  the  US 
mortgage￿MBS markets.  
2 The growing list of the subprime studies includes Greenlaw et al. (2008), Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008), Roubini (2008), Cho (2008), Gwinner and Sanders (2008), Gorton 
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of the Treasury, corporate (non-financial), and credit card debts outstanding 
altogether.
3 Led  by  the  mortgage  lending  sector,  the  total  size  of  non-
governmental borrowing in the U.S. reached about 300% of the GDP in recent 
years, which exceeds that of the Great Depression era (a little less than 250% 
as shown in Figure 1). Judging from the size of the credit market after the 
Great Depression, we can conjecture that the deleveraging process would be 
long and deep if history repeats itself again.  
 
 
Figure 1   Size of Non-government Borrowing in the U.S. (% to GDP) 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman; as reported by the UK Financial Services Authority 
 
 
In order to examine the primary cause for the rise and fall of the subprime and 
Alt-A lending in the U.S., three classes of mortgage credit models, along with 
theoretical underpinning to each of them, are examined: the scoring model 
(Tier 1 Model), the pricing model (Tier 2  Model), and the “sizing” model 
(Tier 3 Model). The Tier 1 Model, developed and popularized from the mid-
1990s,
4  is  essentially  a  tool  for  mortgage  underwriting,  the  process  of 
screening out loans whose risks are not acceptable to be served by market 
participants. The Tier 2 Model, on the other hand, has been used in setting risk 
premiums for guaranteeing mortgage credit losses, both at the loan and pool-
levels, which are set through negotiations between primary market lenders and 
guarantors of mortgage credit risk. Before the subprime debacle, only a small 
number of institutions, including government sponsored enterprises (GSEs; 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and some mortgage insurance companies and 
large lenders, had the internal capability that was necessary to compute these 
                                                            
3 See Cho, Yang, and Lin (2009) for the figures quoted. The real estate lending in 
other countries has also increased in the 2000s, details of which are discussed by IMF 
(2008) among others.  
4 Avery et al. (1996) is one of the early studies on applying the scoring model in 
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fees  in  a  risk-based  fashion.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  before  the  surge  of  the 
subprime  securities,  the  actual  price  setting  was  mostly  internal  (to  those 
market  intermediaries)  and  was  often  done  through  bargaining  among 
involved parties rather than through a truly competitive bidding. Finally, the 
Tier  3  Model  is  used  to  segment  mortgage  pools  into  separate  bonds  (or 
tranches) with different levels of credit loss protection, i.e., credit-tranching 
done  mostly  in  the  non-agency  (or  non-GSE)  mortgage  backed  security 
(MBS) sector. Academic research on this credit-sensitive mortgage security is 
rare, especially on those backed by residential mortgages. 
 
Two  particular  economic  trends,  and  more  importantly,  the  interaction 
between the two, prompted the steep rise of subprime and Alt-A lending from 
the  early  2000s:  that  is,  the  unprecedented  home  price  growth  since  1998 
(until mid-2006); and the highly accommodative monetary policy, evidenced 
by negative real Fed fund rates (FFR) in the 2002-2005 period. Being fueled 
by  this  extremely  favorable  economic  environment,  the  new  issuance  of 
subprime loans increased more than three-fold, from less than $200 billion in 
2002 to over $600 billion in 2006. In the later years, about 70% of the new 
originations were securitized into asset backed security (ABS), some pieces of 
which were re-securitized into collateralized debt obligation (CDO) and CDO-
squared. The whole purpose of the subprime mortgage securitization was to 
package  and  trade  mortgage  credit  risk,  with  the  prepayment  risk  being 
largely controlled via a penalty charged to the borrower for early repayment.
5 
 
There is growing evidence to suggest that reliable data did not exist even to 
build  a  robust  Tier  1  model,  as  discussed  in  Section  4.  Many  subprime 
mortgage products were new to the market (e.g., 2/28 or 3/27 option ARMs
6, 
and  40-year  ARMs),  not  vetted  with  any  real  stress  economy,  and  were 
overlaid  with other risk factors (e.g., high loan-to-value  (LTV), low FICO 
scores,  and  low-/no-documentation  requirements).  Furthermore,  neither 
theories  nor  best  practices  existed  on  some  of  the  key  components  in 
measuring  the  credit  risk.  One  example  is  the  methodology  in  forming 
forward-looking  home  price  scenarios.  This  usually  involved  a  number  of 
difficult  measurement  issues,  such  as  defining  geographical  submarkets, 
estimating  diversification  benefits,  and  specifying  a  proper  volatility  cone. 
Hence, the securitization of subprime loans carried over all the problems from 
the earlier transaction steps: that is, the collateral (pool of mortgage loans) 
with a high degree of cash flow uncertainty, unreliable performance data, and 
the lack of industry best practices on some of key measurement analytics. On 
top of all these, the multiple rounds of securitization exacerbated rather than 
                                                            
5 However, it is reported that subprime mortgages were prepaid quickly during the real 
estate boom because lenders allowed borrowers to do so by waving the penalties. This 
trend was reversed during the downturn as lenders have been rejecting refinancing 
applications, which led to high default and delinquency rates in the subprime lending 
sector. (Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010) and Gorton (2008))  
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reduced  the  problem  of  information  asymmetry  between  MBS  issuers  and 
investors  on  the  underlying  mortgage  credit  risk.  As  the  economic 
environment turned, the “trust” among investors quickly evaporated, and the 
manias of 4-5 years of lending frenzy came to a crashing end from the second 
half of 2007.  
 
The rest of the paper consists of the following five sections: a survey of the 
U.S. mortgage market with respect to key characteristics of mortgage⋅MBS 
products traded in different market segments (Section 2); a discussion on the 
three tiers of the mortgage credit model and theoretical underpinning for each 
tier (Section 3); a survey of the empirical findings on various risk measurement 
issues related to the subprime mortgage and MBS products (Section 4); policy 
lessons to be learned (Section 5); and, concluding remarks (Section 6). 
 
 
2.  Overview of Subprime and Alt-A Mortgages 
 
2.1  Brief History 
 
Before the 1980s, mortgage lending in the U.S. was dominated by savings and 
loans (S&Ls) or thrifts. The funding side of this business was also internalized 
in that it was predominantly provided through their deposit bases.
7 However, a 
series  of  economic  events  since  the  1980s  has  fundamentally  changed  the 
mode of mortgage funding in the U.S., which has also contributed to the rise 
of the subprime mortgage market.  
 
First, high inflation and the prolonged inverted yield curve in the early 1980s, 
coupled with stiff competition from money market mutual funds in attracting 
small savers, triggered the large scale failure of S&Ls in the 1980s, known as 
the S&L debacle. There were efforts on the part of the U.S. government to 
save S&Ls, with the de-regulation of deposit rate ceilings in the early 1980s 
being  the  most  notable.  However,  such  policy  measures  proved  to  be 
insufficient  in  preventing  the  fall  of  S&Ls  in  large  numbers. The  vacuum 
created by the failed S&Ls in mortgage funding was gradually filled by GSEs 
(referring to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) plus Ginnie Mae, the government-
run funding agency, through their MBS issuance. The MBS market has grown 
steadily during the 1980s, and has steeply risen during the 1990s with its share 
in  total  origination  reaching  over  50  percent.
8 The  success  of  this  GSE-
dominated  funding  model  not  only  injected  the  needed  liquidity  into  the 
                                                            
7 See Cho (2007) for more details on the 180 years’ evolution of the US mortgage 
banking system.  
8 There was a policy shift that also contributed to the growth of the MBS market in the 
mid 1980s. That is, as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, investors are allowed to 
form real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMIC), a tax-exempt special purpose 
vehicle that can hold commercial and residential mortgage loans, and issue securities; 
both pass-throughs and multi-class bonds, by using the loans as collateral.    300    Cho 
 
primary market, which in turn, helped raise the home ownership rates, but also 
created a large and liquid MBS market internationally.  
 
Secondly, as the market for MBS grew, the underwriting guidelines of GSEs, 
i.e., the rules as to which loans were eligible for their funding vis-à-vis which 
ones were not, practically segmented the U.S. mortgage market. As shown in 
Figure  2,  conventional  loans  (i.e.,  loans  without  a  government  guarantee) 
were divided into two segments: those that complied with the underwriting 
guidelines of the GSEs; labeled as “conforming” or “A” loans, and those that 
did not; referred to as “non-conforming” loans. The eligibility is essentially a 
bundle of loan characteristics, such as the maximum allowable LTV and debt-
to-income  (DTI)  ratios,  acceptable  borrower  credit  scores,  documentation 
requirements,  interest  rate  variability,  and  so  on.  The  non-conforming 
segment is further divided into two groups; non-prime and jumbo loans.  Non-
prime loans, originally called “B&C” loans, are the origin of subprime and 
Alt-A  mortgages.  Jumbo  loans  are  those  that  exceed  the  size  of  the  GSE 
regulatory loan limit.  
 
 
Figure 2  Segmentation of the U.S. Mortgage Market 
Conventional




C. Non-prime (e.g., B&C)
A. Gov’t-insured  (FHA/VA):  Explicit gov’t guarantee;  Securitized by Ginnie Mae
B. Conforming conventional: Implicit gov’t guarantee; Securitized  by GSEs
C. Non-conforming, non-prime: No gov’t guarantee; Securitized by Priavte
Labels (PLs) via CDO & CDO-Squared
A. G ov’ t -i nsured ( FH A/VA) :  Expl i ci t gov’ t guarantee,  &  securi ti zed by Gi nni e M ae
B. Conform i ng conventi onal :  I m pl i ci t gov’ t guarantee,  &  securi ti zed by GSEs
C. N on-conform i ng non-pri m e:  N o gov’ t guarantee,  &  securi ti zed by pri vate-l abel  
( PL)  M BS i ssuers
D . N on-conform i ng j um bo:  N o gov’ tguarantee,  &  securi ti zed by PL M BS i ssuers  
 
 
Thirdly, the widely-publicized accounting scandals of both Freddie Mac (in 
2003) and Fannie Mae (in 2004) shifted the landscape in mortgage funding 
once again, away from GSEs toward the private-label (PL) MBS issuers. The 
private  funding  institutions  were  mostly  investment  banks  (IBs)  and  large 
commercial banks, including the Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, JPMorgan, 
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and Wells Fargo, as well as several major 
mortgage lenders, such as Countrywide, Washington Mutual, and Indy Mac. 
In fact, the competition between GSEs and the PL MBS issuers is rooted from 
the early 1990s and, more often than not, it went beyond the market place. 
That is, the public policy debate on the role of the GSEs in the mortgage 
market was frequently surfaced as a hot topic for both academic studies and Managing Mortgage Credit Risk    301 
 
media  coverage.
 9 Some  of  the  private  MBS  issuers  even  formed  a  trade 
organization,  called  the  “FM  Watch”,  as  a  vehicle  to  lobby  Congress  for 
limiting the functions of the GSEs in the mortgage finance industry. 
 
2.2  Mortgage and MBS Characteristics 
 
Table 1 compares four segments of the U.S. mortgage market in terms of loan 
and MBS characteristics, including the prime, jumbo, Alt-A, and subprime 
segments.  The  Alt-A  loans  refer  to  those  whose  documentation  or  LTV 
requirements do not conform with the funding eligibility of the GSEs, while 
the subprime loans are issued to borrowers with poor credit histories (hence, 
very  low  FICO  scores)  and/or  with  non-conforming  documentations. 
Compared to other segments, the subprime mortgages also exhibit a higher 




Mortgage products in the subprime market are predominantly adjustable rate 
mortgages  (ARMs),  in  contrast  to  the  prime  market  where  fixed  rate 
mortgages (FRMs) are the majority. The subprime ARMs also have various 
special features, often called “exotic” mortgages, including interest only (IO) 
ARMs, option ARMs (for which borrowers have several options to choose in 
each payment node, including a negative amortization of principal), 2/28 or 
3/27  hybrids  (that  usually  have  below-market  interest  rates  and  non-  or 
negatively-amortizing principal during the first 2-3 years of the loan life), and 
40-year  maturity  ARMs.  These  exotic  mortgage  loans  gradually  increased 
their shares in total subprime origination between 2002- 2006.
11 
 
In terms of the securitization, the collateral in the conforming conventional 
market  consists  predominantly  (over  90  percent)  of  two  particular  FRM 
products;  15-year  and  30-year  FRMs  with  level-paying  fully-amortizing 
principals and no prepayment penalties. These “plain vanilla” FRMs had a 
low degree of uncertainty in projecting post-origination mortgage cash flows 
compared with other products. In terms of risk management, the frequency of 
prepayment from a given mortgage pool and the subsequent reinvestment risk 
                                                            
9 The main problem elaborated in academic studies is the moral hazard on the part of 
GSE caused by the ambiguous relationship with-and the implicit guarantee by the U.S. 
government. See Passmore (2005) for details.        
10 It is also reported that subprime loans generally exhibit high DTIs, typically over 
50% at origination that can increase to over 90% after the reset of payment schedule. 
(Mason and Rosner, 2007) 
11 While IO-ARMs did not even exist in 2001, it amounted to 22 to 37 percent of total 
subprime  origination  in  2004  to  2006.  Furthermore,  the  share  of  low-/no-
documentation loans also increased from about 28 percent in 2001 to over 50 percent 
in 2006. (Cho, 2008) Hence, there has been a toxic combination of risk-layering that 
has  been  going  on,  for  example,  an  IO-  or  option-ARM  with  no  documentation 
requirements and issued to a borrower with an impaired credit history. 302    Cho 
 
are the main risk factors to be assessed and controlled. The representative 
MBS  products  in  this  market  include  pass-through  (PT)  with  no  internal 
structure, and collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) with various tranches 
which have different levels of call protection. Borrower default risk is usually 
not  a  concern  for  investors  as  it  is  controlled  with  external  credit 
enhancements by GSEs and other insurance providers.  
 
 
Table 1  Description of RMBS Categories 
        Pri m e Pri m e Pri m e Pri m e        Jum bo Jum bo Jum bo Jum bo        Al t Al t Al t Al t- - - -A A A A         Subpri m e Subpri m e Subpri m e Subpri m e       
M ortgage characteri sti cs M ortgage characteri sti cs M ortgage characteri sti cs M ortgage characteri sti cs       
L L L Li en Posi ti on i en Posi ti on i en Posi ti on i en Posi ti on        1stLi en  1stLi en  1stLi en  O ver90% 1stLi en 
W W W W ei ghted Average  ei ghted Average  ei ghted Average  ei ghted Average 
LTV LTV LTV LTV       
Low 70s  Low 70s  Low 70s  Low 80s 
B B B Borrow er Credi t  orrow er Credi t  orrow er Credi t  orrow er Credi t 
H i story H i story H i story H i story       
N o credi t 
derogatori es 
N o credi t 
derogatori es 




C C C Conform i ng to  onform i ng to  onform i ng to  onform i ng to 
Agency Cri teri a Agency Cri teri a Agency Cri teri a Agency Cri teri a       
Conform i ng 
Conform i ng by al l  
standard but si ze 
N on-conform i ng 
due to 
docum entati on or 
LTV 
N on-conform i ng 
due to FI CO ,  credi t 
hi story,  or 
docum entati on 
L L L Loan oan oan oan- - - -to to to to- - - -
Val ue(LTV) Val ue(LTV) Val ue(LTV) Val ue(LTV)       




Securi ti zati on attri butes Securi ti zati on attri butes Securi ti zati on attri butes Securi ti zati on attri butes       
M BS Products M BS Products M BS Products M BS Products       
Pass-through 
CM O  
ABS 
ABS,  CD O  
CD O -squared 
ABS,  CD O  
CD O -squared 
C C C Col l ateral ol l ateral ol l ateral ol l ateral        
Predom i nantl y 
FRM s (15-/30 yrs) 
M i xed w i th ARM s 
and FRM s 
M i xed w i th ARM s 
and FRM s 
Predom i nantl y 
ARM s w / “ exoti c”  
features 
C C C Credi t  redi t  redi t  redi t 
Enhancem ent Enhancem ent Enhancem ent Enhancem ent       
External  CE 
I nternal ,   
“ 6-pack”  CE 
I nternal ,  
“ 6-pack”  CE 
I nternal ,  
XS/O C 




Credi t-O AS  
(bei ng devel oped)  
Credi t-O AS  
(bei ng devel oped)  
I I I Issuers ssuers ssuers ssuers        G SEs 
Pri vate Label  
i ssuers 
I Bs &  l arge CBs  I Bs &  l arge CBs 
Source:  G orton (2008);  Cho (2008)   
Aside from GSEs, there are two other sources of external credit enhancement 
(CEs)  in  the  U.S.  mortgage  market.  They  are  the  FHA  (Federal  Housing 
Administration)  as  the  public  mortgage  insurance  (MI)  provider,  and  the 
private mortgage insurance companies (for high-risk loan segments, such as 
above 80 percent LTV loans). The industry of providing external CEs in the 
primary mortgage market in fact has a long history, beginning in the 1930s Managing Mortgage Credit Risk    303 
 
when FHA insurance was first introduced to protect the investors for the long-
term FRM. After a successful operation by the FHA, the private mortgage 
insurance industry was created in the 1950s with authorization laws enacted in 
all 50 states in the U.S. Since then, both private and public MI contracts from 
these  institutions  have  been  serving  as  an  important  market-maker  in  the 
prime MBS business as they practically screen out the default-driven cash 
flow uncertainty for MBS investors. Nonetheless, their risk assessment was 
mostly rule-based, rather than model-based, until the introduction of mortgage 
scoring techniques in the mid 1990s.  
 
Unlike  their  prime  market  counterpart,  subprime  MBS  deals  are  backed 
primarily by ARMs with special features, resulting in a high degree of cash 
flow uncertainty. Furthermore, aside from the default and prepayment options, 
products such as 2/28 option ARMs have an additional option embedded, in 
the  form  of  possible  refinancing  decisions  by  lenders  at  the  time  of  reset 
(hence, an asset to lenders, but a cost to borrowers). That is, subprime lenders 
can waive the prepayment penalty to existing borrowers at, or right after, the 
reset, only  if  market  conditions (home  price  appreciation, in  particular) favor 
doing so. (Gorton, 2008) Due to this added possibility, the cash flow projection 
and risk assessment for subprime mortgage collateral were highly challenging 
from the outset.  
 
 
3.  Pricing Mortgage Default Risk-Theoretical Underpinning 
 
A mortgage contract can be viewed as a composite financial asset with three 
underlying components: a scheduled (or contracted) payment of principal and 
interest, and two competing options of (borrower’s) default and prepayment. 
There has been a reasonably long history of academic research in estimating 
fair  values  of  such  embedded  options  in  the  Mertonian  distance-to-default 
model framework.
12 (Foster and Van Order (1984), Kau and Keenan (1995), 
Buist and Yang (1998), Deng, Van Order and Quigley (2000), and Calhoun 
and Deng (2002)) Originally developed to explain defaults on corporate debt, 
the model’s key exposition is that when the asset value of the collateral (or the 
home value) drops below the unpaid (loan) balance (UPB), the default option 
is in the money, and the borrower will have an economic incentive to put 
(transfer) home to lender at par value of unpaid loan balance. Hence, negative 
home equity (i.e., over 100% effective LTVs), or its likelihood, is the key 
indicator of mortgage default under this strand of the model.  
                                                            
12 The  model,  originally  developed  by  Merton  (1974)  and  extended  later  on  by 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and others, is also termed as a structural model for 
corporate  loan  defaults.  Given  that  the  volatility  of  asset  value  is  given  at  loan 
origination, a standard option pricing model can be used to estimate PD at a particular 
point  in  time  post  origination.  The  reduced-form  model,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
developed by Jarrow-Turnbull and others, which estimates PD by assuming a particular 
distribution of default intensity (e.g., a Poisson distribution).  304    Cho 
 
However,  the  Merton  model  falls  short  in  accurately  assessing  the  default 
likelihood due to two reasons. First, it is mute about payment shock-driven 
mortgage defaults, which represent the primary cause of default for ARMs in 
general  and  the  subprime  ARMs  in  particular.  Borrower’s  liquidity,  as 
measured by the DTI ratio, is shown to be more predictive in assessing default 
risk of this sort (Ambrose et al. (2005) and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010)). 
Secondly,  the  two  embedded  options  are  American  in  nature  (i.e.,  the 
borrowers having a chance to exercise in each and every payment node, or 
360 if it is a monthly-paying 30-year loan contract) rather than European (the 
borrower’s  exercise  being  allowed  only  in  a  particular  time  point).
  13  
Therefore, it is usually intractable to come up with a closed form solution to 
price the mortgage default risk, and instead, numerical techniques, such as a 
Monte Carlo simulation are generally used in real world applications.  
 
In terms of estimating a fair value of mortgage default risk, one can consider a 
general net present value (NPV) approach; that is, the present value (PV) of a 
stream  of  mortgage  insurance  premiums  over  time  for  guaranteeing  credit 
losses should be set to cover the PVs of all anticipated expenses involved, 
including  expected  credit  losses,  required  rate  of  return  to  holding  capital 
reserve,  and  other  intermediation  costs.
14 A  more  conventional  method  in 
academic literature (Chacko et el. (2007) and Duffie and Singleton (2003)) is 
the  risk-neutral  valuation  approach.  Under  this,  the  risk  premium  for 



































) 1 ( ) 1 (
] [       (1) 
where M refers to scheduled payment of the mortgage principal and interest 
(at future time t with economic path p), rj is a time-varying short rate, and E[⋅] 
is an expectation operator. ‘spread’ is the risk premium to be estimated via a 
trial-and-error process, given other factors in (1) being pre-determined. In a 
real world application, equation (1) can be estimated with a large number of 
future economic paths, p, and ‘spread’ can be computed as an average across 
those multiple paths. 
 
 
                                                            
13 Besides these shortcomings, the option theoretic model of mortgage default also 
ignores important institutional features of a mortgage contract, such as the non-recourse 
of credit losses and the leverage enhancement through a second mortgage. On the latter 
issue, refer to LaCour-Little (2007).     
14 Given the lack of a liquid market, the best-practice valuation of mortgage asset is 
conventionally called a cost approach; that is, the spread to be equated with the best 
estimate of credit losses obtained with all available data and econometric models at the 
time of pricing.   Managing Mortgage Credit Risk    305 
 
The key variable to be estimated in (1) is E0 [Mt,p], which is further specified as: 
t p t p t t p t p t M SEV PD M PD M E ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ] [ , , , , 0     (2) 
where PD represents the probability of default (at time t under path p), and 
SEV is the loss severity rate in case of default (i.e., loss rate after liquidating the 
collateral of defaulted loan). Provided that PDt,p
 , SEVt,p > 0, ‘spread’ is ensured 
to be positive. PD, in turn, can be econometrically estimated as follows:
15 
i i
p t p t p t
i
p t e X fico dti pneq ltv f PD + = ) ; , , , / ( , , , , β     (3) 
The explanatory variables on the right hand side include LTV ratio (ltv), DTI 
ratio  (dti),  consumer  credit  score  (fico),  along  with  a  series  of  other  loan, 
borrower, and collateral characteristics (X). Note that ltv and dti are dependent 
upon time path, while fico and X are not. This does not mean that the latter 
variables are constant over time. However, due to the problem in measuring 
these inter-temporally, the usual practice in estimating PD is done under the 
assumption that they are invariant over time. ‘pneq’ represents the probability 
of  negative  equity,  which  is  as  an  interval  estimate  of  the  likelihood  of 
negative home equity. Hence, it is a superior measure to ltv, which represents 
a point estimate of the equity level. β and e are parameters to be estimated. 
 
Equation  (3)  can  be  estimated  either  as  a  multinomial  logistic  regression 
model or as a proportional hazard model. Deng et al. (2000) also controlled 
unobserved heterogeneity in fitting this model. The left-hand side variable in 
equation (3) actually takes various forms; namely, a lifetime PD (until loan 
maturity), early payment default (e.g., a probability of foreclosure or “serious 
delinquency”  within  certain  years  from  origination),  early  payment 
delinquency of different levels (e.g., a probability of more than 60 days of 
delinquency within 2 years from origination), and transition from one state of 
delinquency  to  another  (a  probability  of  90+  days  of  delinquency  to 
foreclosure). Some variations of the above model are often used purely as a 
rank-ordering tool for coming up with mortgage underwriting criteria. (Avery 
et al. (1996)) In applying the scoring approach, the mortgage industry lagged 
behind the credit card sector, which has been using the model developed by 
Altman and others in the 1960s.  
 
Once  PD  (as  well  as  SEV)  is  estimated,  then  the  risk-neutral  insurance 
premium, ‘spread,’ can be obtained. Furthermore, expected credit losses under 
a particular economic path (for a given mortgage type i) and economic capital 
(EC) can be defined as follows:  
                                                            
15 REC should also be estimated, but more often than not a historical recovery rate (or 
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StressPath Loss E Loss E EC − =     (5) 
The type of stress path to use is a crucial decision, not only in computing EC, 
but also determining subordination levels (i.e., the level of loss protection for 
each  tranche  in  credit-sensitive  MBS  products,  such  as  CDO  and  CDO
2). 
Nonetheless, there  is  not  much  theoretical  guidance  as  to  defining  stress 
scenarios  except  the  general  requirement  that  they  are  “extreme  but 
plausible.” (Moretti et al., 2008) A particular scheme of “left-tail scenarios” 
employed  by  Cho,  Yang,  and  Lin  (2009)  in  pricing  credit-sensitive  MBS 
products is shown below: 
￿  AAA tranche to withstand  ] [ 1 0
i
Percentile st Loss E  
￿  AA tranche to withstand  ] [ 2 0
i
Percentile nd Loss E  
￿  A tranche to withstand  ] [ 5 0
i
Percentile th Loss E  
￿  BBB tranche to withstand  ] [ 11 0
i
Percentile th Loss E  
￿  BB tranche to withstand  ] [ 23 0
i
Percentile rd Loss E  
￿  B/NR tranche to withstand  ] [ 50 0
i
Percentile th Loss E  
An  important  consideration  prior  to  implementing  the  above  measurement 
framework, with or without a liquid market for trading mortgage credit risk, is 
quality  loan  performance  data  and  robust  empirical  models  for  key  input 
variables. Without them, the risk spread and indicators obtained are at risk of 
being purely arbitrary.  
 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
4.1  Comparison of PD – Tier 1 Model 
 
ARM products, in general, exhibit lower prepayment risk (due to periodic rate 
resets), but higher default risk (due to payment shocks caused by interest rate 
adjustments)  than  FRM  products.
16 Many  ARM  contracts  also  have  lower 
initial interest rates which are called teaser rates, to compensate the borrowers 
who take interest rate risk and lure borrowers, enhancing the affordability in 
initial loan repayments. It is also believed that more mobile borrowers tend to 
self-select themselves into ARM contracts. (See Brueckner and Follain (1988), 
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Brueckner (1993), LaCour-Little (2007), and Fortowsky et al. (2009) among 
others on consumer choice of mortgage products.) 
 
However,  these  reported  ARM  attributes  are  not  readily  applicable  to  the 
typical  subprime  ARM  (or  hybrid)  products,  such  as  2/28  or  3/27  option 
ARMs. They were new to the market (introduced in the early 2000s), and their 
product characteristics were very much different from the conventional ARMs 
or  hybrid  mortgage  loans,  in  terms  of  negative  amortization  of  principal, 
amount  of  payment  shock  at  the  reset,  and  other  cash  flow  features. 
Furthermore, subprime ARMs in general, impose prepayment penalties, which 
can also increase the default risk (Quercia, Stegman and Davis, 2005). 
 
Two  recent  studies  specifically  estimate  PD  for  the  subprime  2/28  option 
ARMs and made comparisons to FRMs (Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar 
(2005), and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2006)). In particular, using the sample 
that covered 1998-2005, Pennington-Cross and Ho report that the 2/28 ARMs 
have a higher PD than subprime FRMs in the first two years, but default rates 
for  the  two  products  become  very  similar  after  the  reset.  Also,  loan 
terminations  for  2/28s  steeply  increase  at  the  first  reset,  most  of  which 
represent prepayments rather than defaults. However, recent delinquency data 
indicates  that  subprime  ARMs  now  (as  of  the  end  of  2008)  exhibit  much 
higher  delinquency  rates  than  subprime  FRMs;  close  to  four  times  higher. 
These results are consistent with the argument put forth by Gorton (2008) in 
that  the  2/28  products  have  an  embedded  option  on  the  part  of  mortgage 
lender as to refinancing at the time of reset. That is, they waived prepayment 
penalties  and  refinanced  existing  loans  under  the  favorable  market 
environment in 2002-2006, but not any more during the downturn when many 
cash-poor borrowers were pushed to default.  
 
As a more recent study, Lin, Cho and Yang (2008) performed a Monte Carlo 
simulation  analysis  with  three  correlated  stochastic  variables;  mortgage 
interest rate, home price, and household income, to estimate the PDs of five 
different mortgage products, including 2/28 option ARMs. Their results also 
confirm that the PD of option ARMs highly surpasses those of other products; 
about four times higher, with the maximum PD exceeding 60% under a stress 
scenario.








                                                            
17 The stress scenario is defined as two standard deviation units left tails for all three 
economic variables used. 308    Cho 
 
Figure 3  Estimated PD Trend under the Stress Scenario   
















Source: Lin, Cho, and Yang (2008) 
 
 
4.2  Risk-Based Pricing – Tier 2 Model  
 
As mentioned in Section 3, a closed-form solution via a backward propagation 
is generally not feasible for pricing mortgage credit risk, and the pricing tends 
to  rely  on  a  forward  simulation  with  an  anticipated  distribution  of  state 
variables (e.g., a Monte Carlo simulation with forward-looking home price 
distribution).
18 Furthermore, to implement portfolio-level pricing, one has to 
control  diversification  benefits  as  well,  either  across  geographical  areas  or 
product types.  
 
In that vein, a proper specification of home price volatility is critical, but not 
much analysis has been done in that regard. Related to that topic, Yang, Lin, 
and  Cho  (2009)  specify  two  alternative  home  price  models  with  different 
volatility specifications. 
￿  The bottom-up approach with local-market home price forecasts that have: 
A. Average dispersion between individual properties and local home 
price index, and  
B. Forecasting error in projecting local home price trends. 
                                                            
18 See Buist and Yang (1998) and Lin, Cho, and Yang (2008) for three correlated state 
variables used in the mortgage pricing.  Managing Mortgage Credit Risk    309 
 
￿  The top-down approach with national home price forecasts that have (see 
Figure 4 for the composition of the home price simulation cone): 
C.  A plus average dispersion between local vs. national HPIs, and 
D. A forecasting error in projecting national home price trends. 
 
Their  results  indicate  that  the  top-down  approach  is  shown  to  be  a  good 
approximation to the bottom-up approach (the two solid lines for Figure 4), 
which is more conceptually sound, but demanding computationally. It is also 
shown that omitting different volatility terms (A through D in the above) can 
produce significant biases in the PD estimation. In particular, deleting A, and 
deleting  A  and  C  together  in  the  second  approach,  yield  much  lower  PD 
trends (over loan ages), as seen in the two dotted lines in the middle and bottom 
of Figure 4. On the other hand, omitting D does not produce a comparable 
level of bias. As another result to note, Yang et al. also show that the degree 
of diversification benefit from a nationally-diversified mortgage portfolio is 
high, resulting in a significantly lower stress PD and, hence, a smaller capital 
reserve requirement than a geographically-concentrated one, ceteris paribus.
19   
 
 






























Source: Yang, Lin, and Cho (2009) 
 
 
                                                            
19  See  Calem  and  LaCour-Little  (2003)  on  diversification  effects  in  managing 
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Figure 5  PD Estimates under Different Home Price Volatility  



















Source: Yang, Lin, and Cho (2009) 
 
 
In  terms  of  EC,  Lin,  Cho  and  Yang  (2008)  report  the  following  results 
obtained via a Monte Carlo simulation analysis. As shown in Table 2, the EC 
estimated based on Equation (5) is much higher for option ARM products; 
17%, as compared to 3.68% for FRMs.   
 
 
Table 2   PD and Capital among Products 


















FRM30  1.63%  1.00  7.35%  1.00  3.68%  6.19%  1.00  0.59 
ARM_ 
NOCAPS  2.27%  1.39  17.95%  2.44  9.75%  7.59%  1.23  1.28 
ARM511  1.69%  1.04  13.00%  1.77  7.04%  6.34%  1.02  1.11 
ARM511_ 
TEASER  2.74%  1.68  13.67%  1.86  6.97%  8.50%  1.37  0.82 
OPTION 
ARM  4.98%  3.06  32.10%  4.37  17.02%  11.83%  1.91  1.44  
Note: Economic capital is computed assuming LGD 60 percent for PD (Stress) and 
LGD 45 percent for PD (Base Case) Managing Mortgage Credit Risk    311 
 
4.3  Securitization via Credit-Tranching – Tier 3 Model  
 
From a risk management point of view, there are three main pillars that have 
been  propping  up  the  prime-MBS  market.  First,  prepay-tranching,  i.e.,  the 
segmentation of a mortgage pool into multiple tranches with different levels 
of prepayment risk, done by a family of collateralized mortgage obligation 
(CMO) products, has gained investor confidence. In particular, PAC
20-CMO, 
which was first introduced in the mid-1980s, was the milestone product in 
gaining confidence from the investment community. Secondly, the mortgage 
finance industry embraced the concept of option adjusted spread (OAS), first 
developed by the Salomon Brothers in 1986 as a primary tool for measuring 
risk-adjusted returns from CMO tranches. To date, the prepay-OAS statistics 
are widely used in the performance-tacking reports issued by the prime MBS 
dealers.
21 Thirdly,  the  monthly  disclosure  by  MBS  issuers  to  investors,  on 
every 4th business day of each month, shows marked-to-market risk indicators 
for  each  MBS  deal.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  mortgage  loans  used  as 
collateral were also “plain vanilla” products with low cash flow uncertainties. 
 
The subprime MBS, on the other hand, is structured to control default risk, i.e., 
“credit-tranches”  with  different  degrees  of  loss  protection.  The  credit-
tranching itself is  generally  deemed as a  vehicle to reduce the problem of 
“lemons” in the MBS trading: that is, due to information asymmetry between 
lenders/issuers  and  investors  in  assessing  embedded  risks  of  the  deal, 
tranching can reveal risk-return trade-offs that investors can expect (DeMarzo 
(2005), Downing, Stanton and Wallace (2005), and Oldfeld (2000)). However, 
this notion is premised upon perfect and symmetric information, and a noisy 
estimation of underlying loan performance (PD via a Tier 1 Model) will carry 
through the next stages, all the way to determining the size of each tranche 
and coming up with its risk-adjusted return measure.  
 
In particular, the subprime MBS involves multiple rounds of securitization, as 
shown in Figure 6. The first round is to package a pool into an ABS deal. 
There are three ways to control the embedded default risk via structuring the 
deal:  subordination  (to  be  discussed  later),  excess  spread  (XS),  and  over-
collateralization (OC).
22  The typical subordination in the ABS trading takes 
the so-called “6-pack” structure; that is, the senior (or AAA) tranches in the 
deal are protected by 3 mezzanine tranches and 3 junior tranches. 
                                                            
20 Planned amortization class  
21 See Appendix 1 for a conceptual discussion on OAS.  
22 OC refers to the fact that the total amount of mortgage loans backing an ABS deal 
exceeds the total bond to be paid; that is, the asset (of the deal) being greater than the 
liability. XS, on the other hand, means that total interest collected from the pool is 















Figure 6   Securitization of Subprime Mortgages 
Source  :   UBS (2007);   Gorton (2008)
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The second layer is the re-securitization of ABS tranches into CDO deals, and 
the  high-grade  ABS  CDO  and  the  mezzanine  ABS  CDO  as  shown  in  the 
figure.
23 There  is  one  more  layer  of  securitization,  via  pooling  mezzanine 
CDO tranches into CDO
2 (or CDO-squared), due to the problem in marketing 
these middle tranches. That is, while the senior CDO tranches were favored 
by  conservative  investors  (e.g.,  pension  funds)  and  the  junior  tranches  by 
aggressive  investors  (e.g.,  hedge  funds  and  foreign  investors),  the  middle 
pieces did not pull a strong demand. Hence, the MBS issuers re-packaged the 
mezzanine tranches and re-created senior and junior tranches with different 
subordination levels from the original CDOs. 
 
The ABS CDO market has grown from virtually non-existent in 2001 to $261 
billion in new issuances in 2006 (including subprime and other ABS deals). 
This rapid growth was achieved without any industry-wide best practices for 
measuring and disclosing risks embedded in the deals. As mentioned earlier, 
the industry practice was different in the prime MBS market in that it has been 
utilizing OAS as a key measurement tool along with the monthly disclosure 
requirements of mark-to-market risk factors by MBS issuers to investors. The 
subprime ABS CDOs, which grew the most rapidly of any segment of the 
CDO market since the early 2000s, has declined since mid 2007 with virtually 
no new issuances in 2008.  
 
Longstaff  and  Rajan  (2008),  the  only  study  identified  on  CDO  pricing, 
document  that  the  use  of  CDOs  can  produce  a  substantial  diversification 
benefit  in  the  case  of  corporate  bonds.  In  particular,  by  using  the  market 
transaction data between 2003- 2005, they show that on average, 65 percent of 
the  CDO  risk  spread  is  due  to  firm-specific  idiosyncratic  default  risk,  27 
percent  to  clustered  industry  or  sector  default  risk,  and  8  percent  to 
catastrophic or systemic default risk. However, it remains to be seen whether 
or  not  a  similar  diversification  benefit  can  be  expected  from  the  re-
securitization  of  mortgage  bonds  via  CDO  and  CDO
2,  which  is  not  likely 
given the high degree of similarities among subprime mortgage loans in the 
pool.  Nonetheless,  diversification  across  geographical  areas  and/or  across 
different mortgage products would be one possible option for risk reduction 
by having a CDO-like structure.  
 
As  a  final  point,  bond  ratings  have  a  paramount  importance  in  gauging 
embedded credit risks in CDO and CDO
2 deals. The main purpose of bond 
rating  is  to  measure  the  likelihood  of  full  payment  of  interest  either  on  a 
timely or ultimate basis, and ultimate payment of principal to noteholders. 
Specifically, each tranch, starting from AAA, has protection from credit losses 
                                                            
23 The CDO deals illustrated in Figure 6 represent “cash flow CDOs.” Another type of 
CDO that has been widely traded is “synthetic CDOs,” the structured finance vehicles 
that use credit derivatives (e.g., credit default swap (CDS)) to achieve the same credit 
risk transfer as cash flow CDOs, without physically transferring the assets. There are 
also “hybrid CDOs” that combine the features of both. 314    Cho 
 
with subordinated principals allocated to all tranches below it. As shown in 
Figure 6, the AAA tranch is protected by all tranches below it (AA to NR, 
(non-rated)), whose principals equate to the stress losses expected. Therefore, 
the rating agencies should have sound frameworks for the Tier 1 Model, as 
well as a portion of the Tier 2 Model (to generate scenario-specific losses). 
Also,  transparency  in  their  rating  practice  should  also  have  been  a  useful 
market-maker for CDO and CDO
2, which in all likelihood did not appear to 
happen during the boom period. On this topic, Cho, Yang and  Lin (2009) 
model the cash flow waterfall of ABS and CDO deals backed by mortgage 
loans, and report preliminary results on tranche-level risk-return indicators.  
 
 
5.  Lessons Learned  
 
There  were  two  unprecedented  economic  trends  that  promoted  the  asset 
market booms in the U.S. since the late 1990s; the  sustained strong  home 
price growth in the 1998-2006 time period, and the highly accommodative 
monetary  policy,  especially  in  the  early  2000s.  The  level  of  home  price 
appreciation, which was several multiples higher than prior boom periods in 
terms of total appreciation, created a perception of a long run price growth 
among  market  participants,  creating  a  mania  for  investment.  That,  in  turn, 
increased the demand for subprime mortgage products, such as option ARMs, 
which were quite frequently used for purchasing investments or second homes 
rather than primary residences. The crashing end of that boom came when the 
national price index started declining from mid-2006.
24   
 
The  monetary  policy  in  the  early  2000s  is  another  systematic  factor  that 
contributed to the real estate boom since the late 1990s. In particular, the real 
FFR was negative (below the inflation growth rate) between 2002 and 2005, 
as shown in Figure 7. During this period, the spread between 1-year and 10-
year treasuries was floating around 250-300 basis points, inviting the so-called 
“yield curve play” among institutional investors: that is, borrowing in a short-
term  money  market  by  issuing  ABCPs  and  other  products  with  short 
maturities, and using the  mobilized funds to invest in long-term  securities, 
such as subprime MBS.  There is a growing evidence that the Wall Street IBs 
have played this game; that is, they not only served as issuers of CDOs and 
CDO
2s, but also as active investors thereof, either through affiliated hedge 
funds or direct portfolio acquisitions of the securities.
25  
 
                                                            
24 There is a growing literature on the relationship between housing and speculative 
mortgage demand, including Wheaton and Nechayev (2008), Coleman, LaCour-Little, 
and  Vandell  (2008),  and  Avery,  Brevoort,  and  Canner  (2007).  In  addition,  the 
relaxation  of  the  capital  gains  tax  on  housing  sales  in  1997  is  also  quoted  as  a 
contributing factor to the rise of leveraged investment on housing in the 2000s.    
25 For example, UBS had a larger subprime MBS portfolio than the sum owned by 
their hedge funds. (UBS (2008)) Managing Mortgage Credit Risk    315 
 
Before the 2000s, there was only one incident in the last 40 years where the 
real FFR was negative for a time span of 2-3 years in the mid- to late-1970s. 
At that time, the national home prices also rose steeply in the middle of that 
prolonged negative short rate period. The difference between this period and 
the  present  crisis,  however,  is  the  fact  that  the  price  boom  in  2003-2006 
started in the middle of already accumulated strong growth from 1998, while 
the boom in the 1970s began from the depressed home price movement in the 
early 1970s. Hence, the self fulfilling nature of the boom in home prices is 
presumed to be much stronger in the recent incident.
26    
 
With this as background, I will discuss three particular lessons to be learned 
from the subprime mortgage debacle below; that is, the importance of reliable 
loan  performance  data,  need  to  develop  conceptual  guidance  in  measuring 
mortgage  credit  risk,  and  a  process  and  products  for  transparent  mortgage 
securitization.   
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Data Sources: Federal Reserve Bank; OFHEO 
 
 
                                                            
26 As a relevant point, Shiller (2008) also reports that the home price boom in the 
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5.1  Ramification (1): Compiling Reliable Mortgage Performance Data 
 
A  question  to  ask  is  whether  the  participants  in  the  subprime  and  Alt-A 
markets had reliable data to fit a robust PD model; the Tier I Model, for the 
mortgage products traded, such as option ARMs, 2/28s, 3/27s, and 40-year 
ARMs. The answer now would be positive, as we have seen ample cases of 
default and delinquency from those products, but it must have been infeasible 
before late 2006, when the markets started collapsing.  
 
As  shown  in  Table  3  below,  there  is  a  wide  variation  among  90+  day 
delinquency  rates  across  prime  and  subprime  mortgage  products  in  recent 
years, ranging between 24% for subprime ARMs, 8.7% for subprime FRMs, 
5.4% for prime ARMs, and 1.1% for prime FRMs. However, in 2006 Q1, the 
bad  loan  shares  are  virtually  identical  between  FRMs  and  ARMs  in  each 
market segment; the delinquency rates decline between 2002 and 2006 in all 
product  segments,  more  so  in  the  subprime  market.  The  rates  sky-rocket 
between  2006  and  2008,  in  particular  for  subprime  ARMs  which  show  a 
270% total growth during that two-year period.  
 
 
Table 3  90+ Day Delinquency Rates 
A.  2002 Q 4 B.  2006 Q 1 C.  2008 Q 1 03 to 06 06 to 08
Subpri m e ARM 10. 0% 6. 5% 24. 1% -34. 9% 269. 8%
Subpri m e FRM 11. 0% 6. 5% 8. 7% -40. 9% 34. 1%
Pri m e ARM 1. 1% 0. 9% 5. 4% -17. 1% 490. 2%
Pri m e FRM 0. 8% 0. 9% 1. 1% 11. 0% 22. 0%  
Source: Freddie Mac (2009) 
 
 
The ramification is that the historical loan performance data up to 2006 must 
not have been a proper guide in differentiating the performance of subprime 
ARMs, which take about 90% in that market segment, vis-à-vis other products.
27
 
Hence, the performance data available before the market run in 2006-2007 is 
not  reliable  in  fitting  the  basic  credit  model;  the  Tier  1  Model,  which  has 
spillover effects on the subsequent credit models as discussed in Section 3.  
 
There are other reasons to believe that the data up to 2006 is not a good guide. 
First, many subprime products introduced in the 2000s never experienced a 
real  stress  economy,  making  it  virtually  impossible  to  benchmark  relevant 
performance indicators (e.g., stress PD, stress loss, and the risk-neutral spread 
as in equation (1)) under any extreme economic environment before it actually 
happened. Secondly, many Alt-A products did not collect data on several key 
                                                            
27 The empirical findings reported by Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010) confirm this 
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variables  on  the  right-hand  side  due  to  low  documentation  requirements, 
which exacerbated the data problem for measuring credit risk.  
 
5.2  Ramification  (2):  On  Developing  Theories  and  Industry  Best-
practices 
 
As discussed in Section 4, one of the key measurement issues that remained 
unresolved  in  pricing  subprime  mortgage  risk  is  how  to  form  a  forward-
looking home price distribution to be used in the simulation. Unlike interest 
rate  modeling,  which  has  a  long  tradition  since  the  1970s,  conceptual 
guidance for projecting home prices still has a number of loose ends, such as 
the type of forecasting  model to use (e.g., autocorrelated vs. random  walk 
model), ways to segment geography (metropolitan areas vs. states vs. whole 
country),  ways  to  measure  and  reflect  diversification  benefits  (across 
geographical  areas  vs.  across  mortgage  products)  as  well  as  correlation 
between home prices and interest rates, the volatility specification to be used 
(e.g., the top-down vs. bottom-up approach), and so on.
28 Each approach has 
pros and cons, as a theory and feasible industry practice. It is fair to say that 




The study discussed in Section 4; Yang, Lin, and Cho (2009), represents an 
early research effort by showing effects of different sources of home price 
volatility  on  estimating  PDs  and  the  probability  of  negative  home  equity. 
Related to this line of research, defining forward-looking stress scenarios in 
the housing market and setting the corresponding capital reserve levels are 
other conceptual issues to be enlightened with future research. As mentioned 
earlier,  “extreme  but  plausible”  roughly  defines  the  level  of  conceptual 
guidance in defining stress scenarios right now, and so, the extant literature 
should  be  further  elaborated  via  more  full-blown  theoretical  and  empirical 
research in the context of the mortgage market.   
 
Another important area for further research is the role of household income 
and  DTI  in  measuring  and  pricing  mortgage  credit  risk.  The  literature  on 
mortgage  defaults  to  date  has  primarily  focused  on  the  equity  level,  at 
origination and ex post, and its share to remaining loan balance. However, as 
shown in the subprime debacle, payment shock is a highly critical factor in 
determining PDs for ARMs in general and the subprime products in particular. 
As this is mostly determined by interest rate and income processes, properly 
modeling these variables in the measurement of mortgage risk should receive 
                                                            
28 There are other measurement issues in executing the pricing simulation, such as 
correlation across state variables (e.g., between home prices and interest rates) and use 
of second liens. See LaCour-Little (2007) for these issues.   
29 In terms of the industry practice, the forward-looking home price distributions are 
widely varied among subprime MBS issuers up until the early 2007. (Merrill Lynch 
(2006) and Lehman Brothers (2006) stand as notable examples) 318    Cho 
 
more attention going forward. In particular, as ARMs and hybrid mortgage 
products are generally advantageous over FRMs in terms of enhancing home 
purchase  affordability  for  first-time  home  buyers  and  young  borrowers, 
further  research  on  income-driven  variables  is  warranted  for  more  robust 
estimations of PDs and other default indicators.      
 
5.3  Problem (3): On Restoring Mortgage Securitization  
  
It is reasonable to expect that highly complicated mortgage securities, such as 
CDOs and CDO
2s will not be seen again in the market, at least in the near 
future, if not permanently. The problem with such securities, as emphasized in 
this study, is the fact that it is virtually impossible to accurately measure and 
fairly  price  the  embedded  credit  risks  due  to  data  problems  and  lack  of 
conceptual guidance as well as industry best practices. As a result, there is a 
disconnection between the performance of underlying assets (mortgage loans) 
and the prices of those securities. The key lesson to be learned is that the 
security  market  should  not  leap  ahead  without  proper  infrastructure  of 
measuring risks of underlying assets; that is, proper data, theories, and best-
practices as discussed in the earlier sections. 
 
Nonetheless, the credit-tranching itself, as shown in structuring the ABS in 
Figure 6, still has an important role, in my view, in alleviating the information 
asymmetry  between  investors  and  security  issuers  as  to  the  credit  risks  of 
underlying mortgage loans. Provided that the proper infrastructure of the risk 
assessment  is  well-established,  the  credit-structured  securities  can  work  as 
useful liquidity facilities in the mortgage market as well as other borrowing 
sectors.  The  recent  Term  Asset-Backed  Securities  Loan  Facility  (TALF) 
program  instituted  by  the  Federal  Reserve  is  a  good  example  of  utilizing 
prudent and transparent ABS structures for again, mobilizing global funds, in 
order to foster consumer and small business lending in the U.S. and other 
countries.      
 
Finally, a  mechanism, such as  monthly disclosure done in the prime MBS 
market,  which  can  reduce  information  asymmetry  between  security  issuers 
and investors, will be required. Related to this point, evidence is growing to 
indicate  that  the  subprime  and  Alt-A  mortgage  lenders  took  incrementally 
higher credit risks over time since the early 2000s  with  similar credit loss 
assumptions (Calomiris (2008). This was done partly because there was no 
similar mechanism in the subprime security market that could convey the risk 
of underlying mortgage asset periodically. Hence, as a final point, the moral 
hazard  problem  in  the  mortgage  securitization  process,  similar  to  the  one 
observed in the subprime mortgage market, can be alleviated by instituting 
disclosure and other monitoring tools that can make the security trade a more 
transparent and level-playing-field between security issuers and investors.     
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6.    Concluding Remarks  
 
This study aims to shed light on two main analytical issues: first, the type of 
infrastructure that is needed in properly measuring mortgage credit risk, and 
secondly, the specific problems that are observed with the subprime, and to a 
more  limited  extent,  Alt-A  mortgage  markets  in  managing  credit  risks 
embedded  in  the  mortgage  and  MBS  products  traded.  Also  discussed  are 
several  policy  lessons  learned,  including  the  importance  of  the  data  and 
modeling infrastructure and the need to make MBS trading more prudent and 
transparent. As discussed in the prior section, I expect and hope that we will 
see more theoretical and empirical studies on the various issues discussed to 
help guide industry practice.   
 
In closing, we can pose one question to ourselves as to the rise and fall of the 
subprime mortgage markets; that is, could it have been avoided? Although 
different pundits would offer different answers, it is worth noting the claim 
made by the late Edward Gramlich in 2007. In particular, he argued that the 
crisis  could  have  been  averted  had  one  existing  regulation  been  applied 
properly in screening risky mortgage loans. That is, the “high-cost loans” as 
required  to  be  monitored  by  the  Home  Owner  Equity  Protection  Act 
(HOEPA)  of  1994  were  inadequately  defined.  The  law  requires  mortgage 
lenders to perform special tests for high-cost mortgage loans, and those with 
an interest rate more than “eight percentage points” above the benchmarking 
Treasury rates. For high-cost loans, several practices are banned, including 
balloon  payments  in  the  first  five  years,  severe  payment  shocks  after 
origination, and prepayment penalty periods that last longer than five years. 
The problem is that with the existing 8% threshold, only 1% of the subprime 
loans could have been covered. Had it been 5% (3%), about 50% (virtually 
all) of the subprime loans would have been covered. Hence, in hindsight, the 
unprecedented credit losses of the subprime mortgage products and the credit 
crunch that ensued in those market segments could have been avoided, at least 
in the viewpoint of credit risk management. 
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Appendix 1   Option  Adjusted  Spread  (OAS)  and  Its 
Application   
 
The  U.S.  mortgage  finance  industry  has  embraced  the  concept  of  option 
adjusted spreads (OAS) since the mid-1980s. OAS specifically controls: (1) 
the shape of the forward-looking yield curve in discounting MBS cash flows, 
(2) the timing and amount of prepayments in different future time periods, and 
(3) the appropriate benchmark to use in computing the spread at a particular 
time period. As such, it is viewed as a more theoretically-sound measure than 
the alternative risk-adjusted return measures, e.g., the nominal spread (a static 
risk premium of a security over a single risk-free rate), and Z-spread (or zero-
volatility spread that controls the yield curve effect, but not the volatility in 
the state variable nor the propensity of prepayment under different economic 
scenarios). 
 
Specifically, OAS is measured via a trial-and-error process by using a large 
number of simulated paths (N) of economic variables, such as interest rates, 
through  loan  maturity  (T),  and  time-varying  risk-free  rate  (r).  Assuming  a 
known market value on the left-hand side, the formulae below represents a 
typical framework for measuring OAS, s therein. In the case of using a large 
number  of  simulated  economic  paths,  obtaining  s  can  be  computationally 
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CFi,k refers to the cash flow at time period k corresponding to the economic 
path i, and E[.] represents the expectation operator. The obtained OAS is the 
residual  spread  in  that  it  is  the  remaining  risk  premium  after  netting  the 
prepayment risk, i.e., OAS = Z-Spread – Option Cost. See Davidson et. al 
(2003),  Chapter  13,  for  further  details.    OAS  is  widely  used  in  the  MBS 
performance reports issued by the prime MBS dealers.  